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ABSTRACT 
 
This article explores the politics of urban growth in a transitional society. Korea, which is 
experiencing rapid industrialization, urbanization and democratic transition exemplifies a 
set of conditions that might seem to favor the emergence of an urban growth politics and 
business-led growth coalition much like that found in urban areas at the time of 
industrialization, and still prevalent in much of the US and other western democracies 
today. Yet our multilevel case analyses show that the transformations in Korea as a late 
industrializer, late democratizer and late adopter of urban policy have helped to 
consolidate more restricted policies toward urban growth than in the US or much of 
Europe. Multilevel analysis that highlights dynamics at global and national as well as 
local levels illuminates why the growth politics of a transitional society like Korea 
resembles as well as differs from that of older industrialized democracies. 
Across Western Europe and North America over the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, there was a massive migration of population toward urban centers 
along with industrialization and economic growth. Despite variations by country and by 
region, the predominant urban political-economic pattern throughout the industrialized 
world was one of urban growth and economic development.  This paradigm was 
especially pervasive and deeply rooted in postwar American city politics.  A longstanding 
U.S. literature has highlighted how ‘place-based’ urban elites and coalitions - usually 
business-led - drove urban initiatives to expand the local economy and accumulate 
wealth. Molotch (1976:310) went so far as to contend that the political and economic 
essence of the city was ‘growth.’ Up until the 1980s, when new urban issues such as post-
industrialism and environmentalism emerged, coalition building process over the control 
of land use to attract new economic development stood at the center of urban political 
debates. Growth machine and urban regime analyses provided the two most prominent 
strands among a large set of theories that sought to explain coalition building through its 
links to urban development politics (Harding, 1994). 
Following rapid industrialization and urbanization in many developing countries 
since the 1960s, the accumulation of capital and resources within cities has brought 
parallel issues of growth and sustainable development to the fore. At the same time that 
transitional societies have experienced economic prosperity and urban growth, socio-
economic change there has brought about the rise of urban middle class, and political 
change has contributed to the emergence of citizen groups and democratic politics (Park 
et al., 1999; Shatkin, 2004; Wu, 2003; Zhang, 2002). A number of accounts suggest that 
local business elites and economic organizations are crucial to economic development 
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and local growth in developing and transitional societies, but in a different and distinctive 
manner from in North America and Western Europe (Evans, 2002; Wu, 2003). Closer 
scrutiny of urban dynamics in these societies needs to take account of major contextual 
contrasts in capitalist systems, state-society relations, the nature of local businesses, and 
the temporal context of urban policy (Clark, 2000; Evans, 2002). 
The Korean case exemplifies a set of conditions that might seem to favor the 
emergence of an urban growth politics much like that found in rapidly expanding urban 
areas at the time of industrial growth, and still prevalent in much of the United States 
today. Alongside democratization and decentralization, the rapid industrialization and 
urban growth in cities might appear to foster the emergence of business-led growth 
coalition and a basis in favor of continued development. Yet, in fact, the transformations 
in the Korean economy, politics and society have helped to consolidate more restricted 
policies toward urban growth than in the United States or much of Europe. Only a closer 
examination of transformations at national and local levels in Korea, with due 
consideration to the shifting global context, can fully illuminate why. 
 
Urban growth politics in transitional societies: an analytical framework 
 
Much of the growing amount of international comparative research on urban 
growth politics has simply mapped growth and anti-growth coalitions like those of many 
U.S. settings in a very different context. A full understanding of why these models differ, 
as regulation theorists have argued (cf. Lauria, 1997), must take into account a far-
reaching set of national, local and even global variables (Sellers, 2002a). For societies 
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undergoing vast recent transformations, such as Korea, processes of industrialization, 
democratization and urban policy development as well as the comparatively late timing 
of these processes in relation to other developed countries need to be taken into account. 
Urban growth coalition and growth machine theory from the United States outline 
several crucial sets of actors (Harding, 1995; Logan and Molotch, 1987). 1. Rentier and 
other business interests support urban economic and property development. 2. Public 
officials (mainly local) play an important but often secondary role in support of business 
interests. 3. Local residents assert use values and residential property values against new 
economic and property development. Another variant on this account, urban regime 
analysis, has largely reaffirmed this mapping of local actors and interests even as it 
differs as to the explanation of it (Stone, 1989).  With occasional exceptions, the U.S. 
authors have generally portrayed pro-growth coalitions as dominant. 
Comparative analysis of recent growth politics in other developed countries, 
mostly in Western Europe, has often pointed out important limitations to this portrayal. In 
parts of Europe, more statist system of local government and local political economy, 
stronger national political organizations, more extensive national land use and 
transportation policies and an array of other differences have often shifted the balance of 
local interests in favor of constraints on urban development (Fainstein, 2001; Levine, 
1994; Sellers, 2002a). Even in the U.S. some analysts point to emerging post-industrial 
forms of urban growth politics that have created local business interests in the quality of 
life that qualify those in urban development (Clark, 2000).1 Yet most such comparative 
                                                 
1 Cities in advanced economies more and more attempt to attract workers in high-tech and service 
industries rather than traditional manufacturing industries. Because those workers value residential 
environment and quality of life such quality of environment, safety, malls, parks, education, and so forth, 
maintaining these environmental standards in the cities is very important to attract the workers (Sellers, 
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analysis remains confined to developed societies that, like the U.S., experienced 
transformations like industrialization, democratization, and the accompanying rapid 
urbanization long before the late twentieth century. 
As a rare recent case of these transformations, Korea offers an important source of 
insight into the meaning that these transformations are likely to have for the politics of 
urban growth in other developing countries. With explicit attention to these 
transformations and their implications, theories from U.S. settings can shed light on the 
recent politics of urban growth in Korea. A closer look at the applicability of these 
theories, however, suggests reasons why this politics might differ from as well as 
resemble the patterns from the United States. 
 
a.  Late industrialization and the developmental state: continuity and change 
The extraordinary economic success of East Asian countries – especially Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan - in the postwar period raises both scholarly and practical 
inquiries regarding the question, “How did those ‘backward’ countries accomplish such 
unprecedented fast economic growth, although in fact, the fundamentals of their 
industrialization strategies and policies were similar to other developing countries?” 
(Amsden, 1989; Gerschenkron, 1962). The conventional argument regarding East Asian 
economic miracle was that the countries faithfully followed market principles in their 
industrialization process. However, in truth, tremendous economic growth in these 
countries resulted from a different pattern of management of institutions on which rapid 
industrialization was based. Unlike earlier industrializers such as the UK and the US,2 the 
                                                                                                                                                 
2000: 120). 
2 Pempel (1999) characterized the UK and the US in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries as a 
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strong state intervention in the markets of these late-developing countries worked 
exceptionally well to subsidize, monitor, and guide the private sector in achieving 
economic growth (Amsden, 1989; Pempel, 1999; Woo-Cumings, 1995). 
Britain, Germany and the United States which experienced industrial revolution in 
the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries relied upon continuous ‘invention and 
innovation’ of technological knowledge. In contrast, backward countries in the twentieth 
century did not have such foundations and resources of technological advancement. 
Those which succeeded in transforming their industrial and economic structure to raise 
productivity employed ‘borrowed’ knowledge from the earlier industrializers (Amsden, 
1989). In applying this knowledge to the development of production technology and 
capital resources, these countries relied upon the intervention of a powerful state 
(Gershenkron, 1962; Hill and Kim, 2000). 
As developmental state theorists have argued, highly-educated and experienced 
state bureaucrats mobilized and allocated resources to firms selected for their competitive 
advantage against industries in advanced countries - especially export-oriented 
companies (Evans, 1992).3 Bureaucrats were not only executors of the will of lawmakers 
but setters of national goals and standards, and the standards they set drew upon 
international experience (Pempel, 1999; Woo-Cumings, 1995). As Gershenkronian 
theorists pointed out, states took on the risks that individual capitalists avoided in 
launching firms and industry in international markets. By doing so, late industrializers 
                                                                                                                                                 
“regulatory state,” which meant that the states defined their principal function as setting basic rules for 
guaranteeing fair competition in the market and mediating private disputes. 
3 The bureaucrats disciplined firms with centralized resources, gave favor to companies showing good 
performance, and organized crucial aspects of the market for them (Amsden, 1989). 
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rapidly emerged in the global market place that advanced economies had established, and 
posed strong challenges to them with cheaper labor forces and competitive products. 
Parallel to accounts of the Japanese economic miracle from the 1950s to the 
1960s,  work on Korea also demonstrates how ubiquitous and highly capable bureaucrats 
controlled the national finance and monetary system through the Economic Planning 
Bureau (EPB) and the Korea Bank. In particular, EPB set up an economic policy.   ‘Five 
Year Economic Development Plans’ every five years during the industrialization period 
(1960s-1980s) provided administrative and financial aids to highly competitive export-
oriented industries.4 In the process, cities such as Seoul and Pusan became growth poles 
where socio-economic infrastructure for further industrial development was concentrated 
(Chung and Kirby, 2002; Hill and Kim, 2000). 
In responding to the globalizing economy, the East Asian countries have moved 
to shed some of the state-led industrial organizations and practice of the past. Greater 
openness to global markets has constrained the state’s range of options for dealing with 
domestic economic problems (Pempel, 1999). Thus, postwar Japanese, Korean, and other 
developmental state models have been under strain, and policymakers in those countries 
have been actively searching for avenues for reform since the 1990s. Above all, they have 
been compelled to shift from traditional manufacturing industries into more knowledge-
and-technology-based sectors that are not as compatible with a state-led economic growth 
(Hahm and Plein, 1995). With the shift in global economic activities to the Asian Pacific 
region since the early 1990s, the Korean government’s strategy changed to promoting 
high-tech industries (Chung and Kirby, 2002: 125). The early period of export-oriented 
                                                 
4 In addition, the government maintained a low interest rate, made public investment in research and 
development, established export-supporting institutions, and so forth (World Bank, 1993). 
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industrialization and the developmental state began to break apart, even as its legacy 
remained deeply embedded in the politico-economic structure of the country (Moon and 
Prasad, 1994). 
 These national and international politico-economic transformations had 
potentially ambiguous implications for urban development politics. Especially in the era 
of export-led development, the state assembled an array of powers and resources in its 
own hands. Even in the subsequent era of more decentralized economic policy, the 
legacies of the developmental state could be expected to color relations with business and 
rentier interests. At the same time, as a late industrializer, Korea mobilized intensively 
around economic development. Even in the later phase, as the national political economy 
focused on high-tech and service development like that of other developed economies, 
one might expect this mobilization to predominate. 
 
b.  Transition to democracy 
Along with a host of other countries around the world, Korea comprised a part of 
the “third wave” of international democratization during the 1980s and 1990s. Especially 
in Korea and Taiwan, the practice of democratic governance was late, because the legacy 
of Japanese colonial rule produced a lengthy period of authoritarian dominance. 
However, unprecedented world economic growth and the end of Cold War promoted 
circumstances in which a liberal democracy was likely to take root – e.g. high-level of 
living standard and education, and middle class in urban regions and civic activism 
(Huntington, 1991; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). The democratic transition in 1987 
would have far-reaching consequences as well. 
 9
First, there were an entire series of fundamental changes in governing institutions. 
Direct presidential election and the process of amendment of the Constitution were 
constitutionally guaranteed, and several basic political rights such as freedom of press 
and speech, freedom of association and assembly, and so forth were substantially 
promoted, and notorious restrictions on human rights and liberty were abolished.5 In 
addition, local government reform in 1991 and 1994 through the enactment of Local 
Autonomy Act diversified political channels for local society to the power centers.  In 
1995 with the establishment of the elected mayors and council members, local officials 
who had formerly implemented the central government’s policies acquired autonomous 
decision-making powers.6  
Second, democratic value and cultural change in the Korean mass public 
furnished additional resources for democratic consolidation. Pressures and challenges 
from below for democratic governance had helped bring about democratization (Flanagan 
and Lee, 2000).  With this goal achieved, civic activism was channeled into advocacy 
movements focused on diverse policy issues (Kim, 2000). Democratization awoke the 
middle-class groups at both national and local levels, and the political voices of citizens 
gradually increased.  
The links of changes in the local context to democratization are difficult to 
separate out from the politico-economic mechanisms. However, it seems clear that even 
as democratic changes, decentralization and elections could have ambiguous implications 
for growth politics at the local level. Local movements against growth could not only be 
                                                 
5 The Constitution, Article 10-39. 
6 The practice of local democracy - i.e. local elections and full-fledged local autonomy - has been 
constitutionally mandated since 1948, but military rules from 1960s to 1980s ignored it (Oh, 1999: 152-
161). 
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mobilized but empowered. At the same time, however, local officials facing elections 
might find new reasons to pursue economic development that could bring jobs and 
amenities for their citizens. 
 
c.  Late development of urban policy 
Because industrialization took place late in Korea, so did the process of rapid 
urbanization that had usually accompanied industrial development. National policy 
choices about such issues as infrastructure, placement of new urban residences and the 
shaping of urban land use thus took place after parallel policies in much of the developed 
world had already been established. As a result, Korean policymakers could draw on 
well-tested models from other countries. 
In making these choices, the Korean regime of the 1960s-1970s put into place a 
set of policies that looked largely like those carried out in the UK following World War 
II. A key strategy for the control of land use in metropolitan regions was the Green Belt 
that facilitated the containment of agricultural and recreation area, and regulated new 
development.7 With the rapid expansion of urban population and territory (see Figure 1), 
urban and regional planning in the 1970s focused on restricting urban sprawl and 
intensifying the utilization of inner cities (Chung and Kirby, 2002). In order to control 
urban sprawl, the Restricted Development Zone (or Green Belt) was introduced in 1971, 
which strictly managed the expansion of metropolitan areas until contemporary Korea 
(Kwon, 2001). Although Japan failed to implant the concept of restricted development in 
the 1960s, the Korean government successfully implemented the British model of Green 
                                                 
7 The concept of green belt was introduced in the Greenbelt Act of 1938, and practiced in Greater London 
Development Plan (Atkinson and Moon, 1994). 
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Belt under the authoritarian regime.8 With the rapid democratization and the shift toward 
local developmental strategies, it is easy to imagine that the Green Belt policy could have 
been scrapped to make way for emerging local development across the country. Yet the 
rise of civic activism after the democratic transition in urban areas in Korea in fact led to 
reinforcement of growth management policies that were adopted in authoritarian rule. 
The land use controls took on a new political role as resources for a successful growth 
management movement and citizen lawsuits against the pursuit of development. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
 
As a late economic developer, late democratizer, and late adopter of urban policy, 
Korea as a nation thus stood in a different relation to the global context of urban 
development than the U.S. or Europe during the same period. The conditions that the 
national context of policies, institutions and other conditions imposed for urban 
development politics differed in turn. To demonstrate the ultimate effects on the 
dynamics and outcomes of growth politics, it will be helpful to examine how these 
influences played out in a specific case. 
 
 
Growth politics and multilevel change in a Korean city 
The evolution of growth politics in Korean cities manifests the impact of these 
global, national and cultural influences. Korean cities experienced rapid expansion of 
                                                 
8 A total of 5,397㎢ of Korean territory (5.4%) was designated as Green Belt area, despite the deregulations 
in the 1990s (Kwon, 2001). 
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urban areas and explosion of population in a relatively short period (Figure 1).  After the 
democratic transition, popularly elected and empowered local politicians enthusiastically 
embrace local economic development.  At the same time, local growth initiatives faced 
substantial institutional limitations from the central government.  As negative 
consequences from rapid development became clear, growing challenges from civic 
activism mobilized around environmental quality.  Multilevel analysis of the trajectory of 
growth politics in a single Korean city demonstrates the interplay among these diverse 
but interrelated influences. 
[insert Figure 1 about here] 
In the late 1980s, to relieve the heavy congestion and shortage of housing in 
Seoul, the Korean government announced a five-year plan to construct 2 million housing 
units (1988) and new towns within 25 kilometers of Seoul (1989). New town policy was 
first introduced in the postwar UK. The uncontrolled expansion of major cities in the UK 
resulted from the poorly planned industrialization of the nineteenth century, and the 
government felt the necessity to control suburban development for the dispersal of 
congested urban population (Atkinson and Moon, 1994). The New Towns Programme9 
aimed to disperse the population of inner cities.  The population of major urban areas in 
the UK fell over the 1950s and 1960s.  Although it was not clear how much of the 
dispersal was the effect of new towns, the program did contribute to this result (Kwon, 
2001; Atkinson and Moon, 1994). For the Korean government of the 1980s, a similar 
program was perfectly suited to the parallel goal of alleviating the overcrowded 
                                                 
9 The New Town Act of 1946 was the mother law of the programme, and the government appointed 
corporations to carry out the new town construction (Atkinson and Moon, 1994). 
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population in Seoul. Construction of new towns – e.g. Pundang, Il-san, Pyongchon, and 
Sanbon - was completed in the mid-1990s.10
The city of Koyang was one of the satellite cities that resulted.  Consisting of two 
new towns – Il-san and Hwa-jeong districts – Koyang is located 20 kilometers northwest 
of Seoul. Before the national government announced the new town project in 1989, 
Koyang was only a small county that supplied agricultural products to Seoul residents. 
However, with the completion of construction of new towns, the population of the city 
grew rapidly in the 1990s (Figure 2). When the new towns in Koyang were completed 
around the mid-1990s, they became the most preferred residential areas to live in due to 
their natural suburban surroundings, absence of traffic congestion, and safe 
neighborhoods (Munhwa Dailynews Survey, 3 November, 1999). The new town policy 
and migration of population from Seoul metropolitan were smoothly implemented under 
the close guidance of the central government ministries, such as Ministry of Construction 
and Transportation and EPB. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 around here] 
 
With this background, the following cases of politics under local democracy show 
somewhat different patterns of urban growth politics from the central government-
dominant model. Because Koyang was designated to become a satellite city to relieve 
Seoul population and its main function suddenly changed from agricultural area to 
residential town, it did not have the kind of socio-economic infrastructure in which 
                                                 
10 Pundang and Il-san districts were the two largest new towns containing 165,000 housing units and a 
population of 650,000 (Ha, 1998). 
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production activity could occur.11 The elected mayor and council members, facing fiscal 
difficulties with upcoming elections in mind, sought to attract firms and population with 
their newly given discretion and power.  The resulting growth coalition became a 
powerful force for further development. At the same time, however, local interests in 
growth management gradually emerged to express their voices. 
 
a.  The Koyang International Exhibition Center (IEC) project 
Up until the 1990s, Koyang remained an underserved satellite city without self-
sufficient economic infrastructure.  The construction of the Koyang International 
Exhibition Center (IEC), agreed in April of 1999, changed this. With the end to export-
led industrialization initiatives, and Korean membership in the World Trade Organization 
and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (1997), many 
industrial policies and subsidies that supported domestic industries were prohibited or 
restricted.  As a consequence, commercial trade-oriented projects like the IEC became the 
most effective alternative to promote export-based industries.12 In 1998, the Ministry of 
Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE) and Korea Trade Investment Promotion 
Agency (KOTRA) decided to construct a large-scale IEC to support companies located in 
the Seoul Metropolitan Area.13   Koyang and Incheon stood out as strong candidates for 
the site of this facility due to their location, transportation, and infrastructure. 
                                                 
11 For example, only 36% of Koyang residents had their jobs within the city, and 60% commuted to 
neighboring cities including Seoul (KRI, 1998). 
12 For example, German companies contract almost 80% of their exports through international trade 
exhibitions (29 April, 1999, Kyung-in Dailynews). 
13 This is because about 50% of manufacturing industries and 75% of high-tech industries are 
agglomerated around the SMA (Chung and Kirby, 2002). 
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Because it was expected that the construction of IEC would bring a tremendous 
economic effect on local economy, the competition to attract it was fierce between the 
two cities. The city would obtain a tax base reaching 27.6 million dollars per year, create 
40,000-50,000 new jobs, and increase local economic production by 1.1 billion dollars 
per year, if the city attracted the IEC (May 1999, Koyang Newsletter). Accordingly, to 
local politicians and businesses, it represented a perfect chance to revive the local 
economy that had been suffering since the economic crisis of 1997. 
At this time real estate in Koyang was undervalued.   The city was literally a 
‘bedroom town’ lacking social and industrial infrastructure.  As a result, almost all 
interests in the city were eager to attract the IEC to Koyang.  As Molotch (1976) 
mentioned, the city mobilized as a single entity around growth, and supralocal as well as 
local actors joined in support. National Assembly members who had their constituencies 
in Koyang districts and the governor and politicians of Kyeong-gi province became 
strong advocates.  They lobbied, sent letters, and opened symposiums to attract the IEC. 
The city council established a special task force team, namely “Special Committee for 
Promoting Self-sufficiency of Koyang” (21 September, 1997), and the members sent 
several official letters which urged central politicians and bureaucrats to decide the 
location of the IEC to be Koyang. Local interest groups and new town residents were also 
strong supporters, arguing that real estate in Koyang was seriously undervalued because 
of the lack of industrial infrastructure.14
Against this backdrop Dong-Young Shin, the appointed mayor from 1992 who in 
1997 won election to that office, became a core player in the growth politics of Koyang. 
                                                 
14 As predicted, the price of the new town apartments and lands in Koyang substantially increased right 
after the attraction of the IEC (Hankyoreh Newspaper, 24 June, 1999). 
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As an elected mayor, he actively organized and mobilized his political resources and 
showed a strong willingness to keep the jobs and attract firms. His strategy was mainly 
one of making and drawing on political connections. First, because the authority to 
decide the location of the IEC was vested with central government agencies MOCIE and 
KOTRA, he made great efforts to work in conjunction with central government officials 
and politicians in pursuit of the attraction of the IEC.  Fortunately, he belonged to the 
ruling Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) during his second and third mayoralty 
(1995-1999).  The governor of Kyeong-gi province belonged to the same party.  Through 
these connections, Mayor Shin could easily build lobbying channels and gain support 
from many National Assembly members. 
Second, he mobilized potential and active proponent groups of urban growth 
policy within Koyang. He held several unofficial meetings with members of local 
chamber of commerce, small business associations, and landowner groups. Groups such 
as the Koyang Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Koyang Farmers League, the 
Committee on New Town Development, and the Association for Restoring Property 
Rights of Greenbelt were strong supporters.  These groups had merged to form the 
Alliance for Koyang’s Self-sufficing Economy (AKSE) in 1994. The constituents of this 
alliance were mainly land-based interest groups including landowners, developers, and 
local merchants. AKSE was an especially strong political group in Koyang, and it had 
attempted to obtain political power by having its members run for government positions, 
but failed every time.15 Therefore, after several attempts, they tried to initiate a special tie 
                                                 
15 Because of many restrictions on land-use in Koayng, - e.g. Military Facility Protection Act (MFPA), 
Green Belt, and Capital Region Planning Act (CRPA) - about 57% of city’s territory and private property 
had been labeled “growth management area” with minimal monetary compensation from the government. 
Therefore, property-related interest groups became a strong proponent of urban development policy. 
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with local politicians and government leaders. Mayor Shin did not hesitate to establish a 
congenial relationship with this group.  A mayor-centered growth coalition thus came to 
power, and ultimately proved critical to growth politics in Koyang.  Even new town 
residents who are usually classified as potential opponents of urban growth in the urban 
politics literature joined forces for the attraction of the IEC.  
With this mobilization of support at higher levels of government as well as within 
the city, Koyang won designation as the new location for the IEC. The growth politics in 
Koyang described in this case can be understood in several types of conditions. The 
model of the developmental state from 1960s-1980s continued to provide the incentives 
and tools for local economic development, even as developmental initiatives shifted 
toward more post-industrial, high-tech and service-oriented activitiies (Castells and Hall, 
1994; Sassen, 2001). National land-use controls such as Green Belt, MFPA, and CRPA 
persisted as influences on local policymaking and development into the era of local 
democracy (Hill and Kim, 2000). But regardless of these regulations and restrictions on 
local politics, pro-growth coalitions proliferated.  After the first local elections in 1995, 
an elected and empowered mayoralty became the key actor on behalf of local growth 
politics in the city. 
 
b.  Rezoning the agricultural area 
As soon as Koyang attracted the IEC in April of 1999, the city government 
announced the new land-use plan, namely ‘The Charter for Admission of Hotel Industry 
in Koyang Agricultural Area,’ and submitted the bill to the city council (18 May, 1999). 
By rezoning agricultural area that composed 16% of Koyang territory, the government 
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attempted to raise the exchange value of old towns, revive local economy and tourism, 
and expand local tax base. According to the government, constructing numerous hotels 
was essential in order to host international-scale exhibitions after the completion of the 
new Koyang IEC. The plan would provide an equal opportunity to raise the value of old 
town properties that had been excluded from the benefit of development because of the 
several land-use regulations. Moreover, along with the attraction of the IEC, the project 
sought to dramatically alter the image of the city from that of a ‘bedroom town’ to a more 
service-oriented center of hotels, conventions, tourism, and a high-quality of urban life. 
In 1997 controls over agricultural land, vested solely in the central government 
under the authoritarian regime, were devolved to the local governments under national 
supervision.16 In light of such persistent land-use controls as the Military Facility 
Protection Act (MFPA) and the Capital Region Planning Act (CRPA), local rezoning of 
agricultural areas under this new authority emerged as the most suitable avenue for 
pursuit of new development.   
Mayor Shin could easily mobilize pro-growth interests on behalf of rezoning by 
emphasizing the project’s economic effects: a better neighborhood, healthy local 
economy, and effective land-use in old towns. Because old town residents and businesses 
had been excluded from the state-led development due to various land-use regulations 
such as Green Belt, MFPA, and CRPA, most of them belonged to the property-rights-
related groups such as Alliance for Koyang’s Self-sufficing Economy (AKSE) and 
strongly supported the project. They had several undisclosed and unofficial meetings with 
the mayor to support the bill, and the alliance between them and the city government 
                                                 
16 In the National Land-Use Management Act of 1994, central government had deregulated the 
construction of lodging facilities in agricultural area, but re-regulated those lodging facilities by delegating 
the authority of permission of the hotel construction to the mayor in the revised law in 1997 (Article 15). 
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became a stable relationship in the process. Even after Mayor Shin died unexpectedly in 
1999, his successor Mayor Kyosun Hwang continued in relentless pursuit of this project.  
In the process, legally required official hearings on the project were omitted. City council 
members from old town districts strongly supported the passage of the plan.  On May 27, 
1999, without serious discussion or investigation, the Council approved the project. 
Unlike in the IEC case, however, there was a growing disagreement with the 
city’s plan and there were skepticism about the economic effect of the hotel construction.  
(SAY FIRST WHO WAS SKEPTICAL AND BRIEFLY DISCUSS THEIR MOTIVES. 
THEIR ARGUMENTS ARE INTERESTING ENOUGH TO INCLUDE BUT 
SECONDARY TO OUR STORY.) According to the city’s plan, fifteen to twenty 
medium-sized hotels would be admitted in the agricultural land, but for the skeptics, 
those size and numbers of hotels did not seem likely to be profitable or beneficial to the 
local economy. The estimated cost of construction of each hotel was about two or three 
million dollars, but from the skeptics’ perspective, small construction companies in 
Koyang could not afford even this relatively low cost, and they were not comparable in 
terms of capability to national-level companies. In addition, the skeptics worried that 
those medium-sized hotels would create a negative image of the city because in Korea 
small or medium-sized lodging facilities were regarded as what is so called ‘love hotels’ 
where extra-matrimonial affairs usually took place. They worried that those hotels would 
damage their residential and educational environment as well as the image of the city. 
At first, some environmental activists complained about the city’s plan 
individually by pointing out the lack of public hearings and the illegality of the 
procedure. However, after the passage of the bill in the city council in May of 1999, 
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neighborhood organizations such as Koyang Citizen Association and New Town 
Residence Representatives eventually recognized the problems of the bill, and carried out 
neighborhood movements that became a collective resistance to the city’s plan. 
Eventually these activists and neighborhood organizations formed a collective citizen 
movement organization, namely “the Committee for Protecting Residential Environment 
in Koyang,” and several citizen, religious, advocacy organizations joined forces. Some 
city council members who were elected in new towns, Association for Koyang Christian 
Churches, Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA), Koyang Youth League, 
Koyang Women’s Union the Committee of Parents for ‘True’ Education, and numerous 
other groups participated in this neighborhood movement. In addition to picketing and 
complaining directly, this collective action committee hired professionals in environment 
and urban planning, and held press conferences to inform the public and higher 
governments to challenge the government in more systematic and institutional manner. 
The groups attempted to bring a citizen lawsuit against the city officials, though public 
litigation was not yet permitted in Korea, and carried out a 10,000 signature-collecting 
campaign. Through several national-level mass media coverage highlighting the pitfall of 
the city’s plan, this case of rezoning agricultural land received nation-wide attention, and 
neighborhood groups and non-profit organizations in other regions announced statements 
to support Koyang’s citizen movement. 
As a consequence of these efforts, the bill regarding rezoning of the agricultural 
lands was finally abolished in the city council in November 1999. (ADD A SENTENCE 
OR TWO ON WHAT ANTI-GROWTH TOOLS, GROUPS OR INITIATIVES SEEM 
TO HAVE BEEN MOST DECISIVE FOR THIS RESULT.) In this case, the structure of 
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confrontation between pro-growth and anti-growth groups was clearly identified as 
growth machine theory argued, but there were also several differences. First, elected 
mayors pursued several development plans for the city, and in doing so effectively 
mobilized local businesses and property-related groups in old towns. Unlike in the US, 
local business associations and rentier groups17 remained weak throughout this period, 
leaving capacities to pursue growth power centered in the mayor.  Second, there was a 
rise of civic activism that valued the quality of life in the city, and especially new town 
residents who moved from SMA and were in the middle and well-educated class.  These 
groups emerged as strong and effective proponents of constraints on growth. 
 
c.  Commercial and residential complex project 
Before the development of new towns in Koyang, there were 27.4 acres of 
industrial lands in Baek-sok Dong area which was the gateway to Il-san district, one of 
the new towns in Koayng, and the city government initially had planned to attract large 
scale publishing companies on that land to be known as ‘Publishing Industrial District.’ 
The government had attempted to transform the city’s industrial structure toward more 
cultural and service-oriented city. Under land-use regulations such as MFPA and CRPA 
that prohibited new-entry of pollution-causing factories and labor-intensive industries in 
the SMA, cultural or service-oriented industries such as publishing industry were 
alternatives to get around the those regulations. However, the government failed to attract 
publishing companies that were supposed to be established in Koyang in 1994, and thus 
Baek-sok Dong remained vacant for ten years since 1989. 
                                                 
17 Unlike the ‘rentiers’ and developers in the growth machine, there were no big landowners and local 
businesses who could enjoy the benefit of the developments, and thus they had no choice but to form a 
coalition with the strong mayor. 
 22
Because leaving 27.4 acres of the city’s gateway vacant was wasteful to the whole 
city, the government attempted to establish several development plans. In 1999, a 
national-level (PUBLIC OR PRIVATE?) construction company, Yojin Construction Co., 
contracted the Baek-sok Dong land for 53.6 million dollars, and the government allowed 
construction of a fifty-five-storied commercial-residential complex (hereafter the CRC). 
The CRC project included a 55-story building in Baek-sok Dong area, and new 
commercial facilities, malls, office spaces, and convention centers. The project would 
provide housing for 3,400 Korean households and additional thousand households for 
visitors.  
Many landowners and residents in Baek-sok Dong area had complained that the 
area had remained undeveloped for an extended period after 1994.  In a hearing of the 
urban planning committee in January 2000, Mayor Hwang forcefully asserted that the 
government could not leave the land undeveloped any more. He pointed to numerous 
problems that development in the area would address.  It would improve the visual 
appearance of the city, compensate residents for economic losses from previous 
underdevelopment, and facilitate efficient land-use planning of the city. In addition, he 
argued that the CRC project would bring an increase in local government revenue. The 
urban planning department of the city contended that the project would generate over one 
billion dollars in local economic benefits, including 7.5 million dollars of government tax 
base, and 10 million dollars of profits to local businesses.  
Because the city government’s bill on rezoning agricultural land was halted, pro-
growth actors tried to avoid conflict with anti-growth groups by following appropriate 
legal procedures.  In addition to public hearings, conferences were held to discuss the 
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CRC project. In these meeting, advocates of pro-growth policy endorsed the new project. 
The CEO of Yojin emphasized the company’s various experiences in urban development 
and constructions in Koyang18, and promised that Yojin Town (the CRC) would build a 
stable local tax base, reduce unemployment rate by hiring local workers, and implement 
effective urban planning by consulting with officials. In addition, old town residents who 
lived nearby Baek-sok Dong, and whose properties had remained underdeveloped for 
over ten years, mobilized against the growth management activists. A newly formed 
“Residential Committee on Development of Baek-sok Dong” cooperated with the AKSE 
which was the strongest pro-growth interest in Koyang. 
Civic activist groups supporting growth management had by now became much 
stronger, more engaged and more proactive in the policymaking processes.  Initially 
uncoordinated, they gradually organized into a single coalition.  Eleven citizen movement 
organizations including Koyang Citizen Association and Korean Federation for 
Environmental Movements (KFEM) formed an umbrella group, called the “Citizen 
Committee for Opposing the CRC,” which responded systematically to the pro-growth 
coalition.  The group participated aggressively in the public hearings. Through several 
press conferences at both local and national levels, it marshaled support from various 
citizen movement organizations.19  In hearings and press conferences, opponents brought 
forth professional experts to testify on inappropriate aspects of the project.  They 
questioned what they portrayed as the hidden goals of the project.  They circulated a 
                                                 
18 Yojin Co. carried out several constructions such as malls in downtown Koyang, and thus was relatively 
well-known to the residents. 
19 For example, KFEM which was the most powerful and largest environmental movement organization 
with 43 local branches joined the citizen committee to support this neighborhood movement. 
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petition to higher governments and politicians for an abolishment of the city’s plans for 
the project, and brought a citizen lawsuit against it.  
Throughout these activities, opponents mustered an even broader array of 
arguments than they had against the agricultural rezoning.  The large number of 
households to be added could possibly lead to overpopulation, straining service provision 
in the city.  A national rather than a local company would assume control of 
development.  Partly as a result, the project was not likely to bring a significant economic 
effect to Koyang’s economy.  As an alternative, opponents suggested that the city 
government attract high-tech related industries instead of the CRC.20  In a separate 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) of the CRC, environmental experts 
commissioned by the opponents found that the city’s EIA was not thoroughly executed to 
estimate the impact of the CRC on neighborhood environment and transportation (Donga 
Il-bo, 29 January, 2000).   Inappropriate use of mayoral authority in Koyang also became 
a common target of the citizen movement organizations in the mass media coverage.   
The increasingly organized confrontation between the pro-growth forces and anti-
growth groups produced an impasse.  The mayor had mustered a powerful coalition 
around a large-scale developmental agenda that could have a huge economic impact on 
the city.  As in the case of the agricultural rezoning, old town residents and both local and 
national business were strong proponents of the development.  Yet the challenges from a 
growing, increasingly sophisticated array of groups again drew on the national legislation 
and other resources to pose a major obstacle to development.  The environmentalist and 
                                                 
20 In addition to these various modes of civic activism, picketing, emailing and street demonstrations were 
widely used in the process. 
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neighborhood movements had now mobilized more broadly and organized more 
effectively.   
 
d.  Discussion 
These three cases in the analysis demonstrate a gradual evolution in the politics of 
urban development in Korea from the 1980s to the end of the 1990s. . Koyang as it exists 
today is a product of the decision of the authoritarian central government of the 1980s to 
develop new towns outside the Seoul Metropolitan Areas to relieve overpopulation and 
environmental degradation.  This successful policy drew partly on the experience of 
western democracies, especially the UK.  After the mid-1990s, when democratization at 
the national level led to the institutionalization of local democracy in Korea, the 
conjuncture of ongoing economic and political  the urban growth politics in Korea that 
was both similar to and different from the case of the United States and Western Europe.  
Over the 1980s, with the decentralization of planning and other authorities in 
France, the local politics for growth also shifted from a statist to a market-oriented 
pattern that more closely resembled arrangements in U.S. cities.  As a number of authors 
have pointed out (Levine 1994; Sellers 2002), legacies of continued statism persisted 
even into this era.  As in France, the combined effect of the institutional legacies of the 
Korean developmental state and democratization has generated pro-growth coalitions 
around the mayor rather than rentier interests. Even as the mayor increasingly occupied 
the pivotal position in the pro-development coalition, hierarchical supervision by 
supralocal governments persists.  As seen in the Table 1, the newly elected mayor in 
Koyang endeavored to develop the city by attracting national facilities (the IEC) or 
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businesses (the CRC and hotels).  Rentiers and local businesses became strong supporters 
to the mayor’s policy, but their influence was limited. As a consequence, the pro-growth 
coalition in Koyang became a mayor-centered coalition. 
At the same time, contemporary industrial development – especially in high-tech 
industries – spawned an educated middle-class like that of the post-industrial U.S. and 
Europe.  This development proved crucial for the movement to limit local growth. As the 
developmental state creates a highly trained and technically sophisticated workforce, and 
houses it in new towns like Koyang, the resulting new concentrations of middle-class 
families shared a culture of concerns about the quality of life and a growing commitment 
to civic activism (Clark and Hoffman-Martinot, 1998). These residents ultimately 
comprise potentially powerful new constituencies of movements that take advantage of 
the opportunities in growth management. This balance between pro-growth coalition and 
growth management have not been possible with land-use control policies such as the 
New Town, Green Belt, and planning regulations that served under the prior regimes as a 
tool of authoritarian control.  Adopted in the very different political context of an 
authoritarian state mobilized around export-led development, these policies became part 
of the opportunity structure under democracy that facilitated effective local challenges to 
local development. 
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
Conclusion 
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Multilevel analysis furnishes an explanation for both similarities of emerging 
growth politics in Korea to the experiences of the U.S. and other developed countries, 
and for enduring differences. Through the lens of this analysis, it becomes clear why 
forces in favor of growth management emerged immediately with the advent of planning 
despite at least dramatic mobilization around economic development as in earlier 
societies that underwent industrialization. From the emergence of urban policy to its 
democratization, growth management has remained much more a hallmark of urban 
growth politics in Korea than in most of the U.S. and even parts of Europe. 
Over a period of little more than a decade, the emerging patterns of urban growth 
politics in Koyang resembled those in the cities of advanced economies in many respects.  
The Mayor, local businesses, and rentiers mobilized around developmental initiatives in a 
manner analogous to growth coalitions in the U.S. or France.  At the same time, an 
understanding of the distinctive features of growth politics in Korea require at least as 
much attention to forces and dynamics beyond the local level alone. 
From the 1990s, as urban development in Koyang produced a rapid growth in 
population, two shifts at the national and global levels converged.  In the political arena, 
Korea joined the third wave of democratization, and proceeded to decentralize  
authorities to local governments. At the same time, with the take-off and industrialization 
of the national economy, the politics of urban growth shifted toward the commerce, 
service and high-tech orientations that older developed countries were increasingly 
adopting. The main consequence in the case of the IEC was the emergence of a local 
growth coalition under the leadership of the elected mayor. By the end of the 1990s, 
however, with the contestation over agricultural rezoning, civic and neighborhood 
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movements opposing the mayor-led development acquired widespread support within the 
highly educated, affluent population that increasingly dominated the local population. 
Through a lawsuit combined with other modes of movements, these groups succeeded in 
invoking national urban policies such as Green Belt to defeat the pro-growth coalition.  
Quite unlike in the U.S., supralocal influence remained an important element in 
both sides of the subsequent contestation over urban growth.  The local movements 
against the agricultural rezoning and the CRC drew not only on national organizations 
and national publicity, but on the national legislative protections inherited from the 
authoritarian regime.  At the same time, the legacies of statism left local officials – 
especially the mayor – with a greater role than local business and rentiers play in the 
implementation of growth policies than in the U.S. (see Keating, 1991). 
Rapidly industrializing economies and democratic transitions in newly developing 
countries provide the most favorable circumstances in which urban growth politics are 
likely to occur as the U.S. cities experienced.  This analysis demonstrates the necessity of 
situating any analysis of the local politics that result in its wider global and national 
context.  Rapid industrialization, democratization and post-industrialization on the one 
hand, and the legacies of state intervention and late policy development on the other, 
have created conditions for local growth politics in Korea that remain distinct from those 
of earlier industrializers.  Similar multilevel influences are likely to furnish much of the 
explanation for the variations in urban growth politics among transitional countries as 
well.  
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Figure 1. Urban population in OECD countries 
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Figure 2. Rapid Growth of Population in SMA cities 
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  Koyang New Town 
International 
Exhibition Center 
Rezoning 
Agricultural Area 
Commercial and 
Residential 
Complex 
Time Period 1989-1996 1989-1999 (mainly after mid-1990s) 1999-2000 1999-present 
Policy Goals 
Relieve urban 
congestion, house 
workers 
Attracting International 
Exhibition Center 
Rezoning agricultural 
area and constructing 
international-level 
hotels 
Constructing 
commercial and 
residential complex 
Supralocal 
Influence 
Central 
government’s 
decision 
1. Restricted development regulations and growth management policies. 
2. Supervision from higher governments (central and provincial 
government). 
3. Limited authority of mayor: budget limitation, and regulations. 
Pro-growth 
Actors 
Central government 
(ministries) 
Almost all city residents 
National Assembly 
members 
Kyeong-gi Province 
Mayor 
Rentiers 
City council members 
(old town districts) 
Local construction 
companies 
Mayor 
Old town residents 
(rentiers) 
Yojin Construction 
companies (national 
level company) 
Anti-growth 
Actors None 
Citizen movement 
leaders 
(small numbers) 
Citizen movement 
leaders 
New town residents 
Religious, 
environmental 
leaders 
City council members 
(new town districts) 
Citizen movement 
leaders 
New town residents 
Local Business 
Power (Not involved) Weak Weak Weak 
Permission of the 
Project National ministries 
National Ministries 
(MCIE, KOTRA) City mayor City mayor 
Types of Local 
Coalition N/A Mayor-centered coalition (Mayor + rentiers, weak business) 
Policy Outcome Success Success Failure (Citizen Lawsuit) 
Pending 
(Citizen Lawsuit) 
 
Table 1. An analysis of the cases 
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